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ABSTRACT
Uruguay is one of the most prodigious users of mechanism of direct democracy in 
the  world  and  it  provides  a  rich  milieu  to  test  many hypotheses  advanced  by  a 
literature that principally comes from the “north,” and very especially from Switzerland 
(the world champion of direct democracy) and from the United States, where direct 
democracy is frequently used at the state level.  This literature tends to suggest that 
economic interests or social groups could easily utilize direct democracy for their own 
particular  benefit,  making  it,  in  the  end,  harmful  to  representative  democracy. 
Nonetheless, this study will show that, at least for the Uruguayan case, this argument 
does not hold equally and consistently for all cases. Mechanisms of direct democracy 
in  Uruguay  do  not  undermine  representative  democracy  because  their  passage 
depends largely on the mobilization efforts of organized partisan groups operating 
outside the conventional legislative arena. In this small country, unlike other cases, 
the central actors working for the approval of mechanisms of direct democracy are 
political parties’ fractions, the basic institutions of electoral, legislative, and political 
representation.  Therefore, an overall normative evaluation of mechanisms of direct 
democracy as either inherently good or bad for representative democracy must take 
into account the very different institutional contexts in which these mechanisms are 
utilized, as well as the strength of the political actors involved.
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1. Historical and legal context
Uruguay  is  the  Latin  American  country  that  lived  for  the  longest  time  under 
democratic  governments  .  This  single  fact  seems  strong  enough  to  make  it 
remarkable.  By almost any criteria, the country has been an institutionalized liberal 
democracy for a significant part of the 20th century, with political conflict and change 
following institutionalized and democratic procedures.  However, in spite of being the 
Latin American country with more years of democratic experience since the turn of 
the 20th century,  no constitutional regime in Uruguay has survived more than 18 
years  without  suffering  significant  changes.   In  particular,  the  country  has  seen 
continuous  turnover  regarding  electoral  rules  and  the  structure  of  the  executive 
branch  (for  example:  semi-collegiates,  “pure”  collegiate,  “classic”  presidentialism, 
etc.).   Nonetheless,  despite  this  institutional  volatility,  some  practices  excel  for 
enduring  longer  than  others,  even  to  the  point  of  transforming  themselves  in  a 
tradition.   Among these,  an institutionalized said for  citizens in regard any mayor 
institutional  and constitutional  change (first  in the form of  obligatory referendums, 
then  in  the  form  of  popular  initiatives,  and  finally  in  the  form  of  facultative 
referendums).  As a matter of fact, Uruguay is one of the most prodigious users of 
mechanism of direct democracy in the world .  
It  is  possible  to  trace  direct  democracy  in  Uruguay  since  the  constitutional 
discussions of the mid-teens of the twentieth century.   Although the constitutional 
plebiscite was included in the constitution of 1934, along with popular initiatives, it 
was utilized already in 1917 in order to decide if the president could be reelected, the 
shape a potential  National Council  of  Administration would have (semi-collegiate); 
the universal male vote; the separation of Church and State, and other points.  Since 
1934, obligatory referendums (also known as “constitutional plebiscites”) and popular 
initiatives were utilized in several times but it was not until the constitution of 1967 
when referendums were included in the chart (through an obligatory referendum, of 
course).  Figure 1 shows a typology of mechanisms of direct democracy (and those 
that exist in Uruguay) and when they were used in Uruguay.  
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Figure 1: 
Mechanisms of Direct Democracy
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It is not a coincidence that direct democracy arrived to Uruguay earlier than in most 
countries of the world.  José Batlle y Ordóñez, a Colorado, assumed the Executive in 
1903; the legacies of his two administrations (1903-1907; 1911-1915) remain strong. 
Batlle’s “project” represented the most radical challenge to the status quo presented 
by any Latin American reformer during or since this period.  His two administrations 
ushered in a three-decade-long cycle of reform, the societal manifestations of which 
included modernity, democracy and an indelible link between the state and batllismo. 
Batlle’s  first  presidency  focused  largely  on  processes  of  state  building  and  of 
institutionalizing  democratic  norms  and  it  was  during  his  second  presidency  the 
nation’s  welfare  state  took  its  form and  content.   The strategy  of  batllismo  was 
incorporating  broad  sectors  of  society  (from  workers  to  immigrants)  without 
confronting the classic oligarchy and without adopting a conservative order (Lissidini 
1998: 173).1  
During those years, several members of the Uruguayan political elite, starting from 
Batlle himself, were strongly influenced by the liberal thoughts coming from France 
and Switzerland.  Batlle recognize this influence: 
1 Thus Uruguay, along with Costa Rica and Chile, followed the Marshallian sequence of civil-
political-social rights .  O’Donnells argue that “Uruguay, on its part, with its very early welfare 
state, achieved social and political rights almost simultaneously.  One way or the other, the 
pattern  in  these  three  countries  is  similar  to  those  in  the  Northwest  in  the  sense  that, 
especially in the urban sectors, there existed a reasonably high degree of implantation of civil 
rights previously to the achievement of social and political ones .
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While my candidacy held fast, I was visiting France and Switzerland where I studied 
close  the  thousand  aspects  of  their  democratic  political  life,  and  compared  the 
political forms of the European States with the archaic and very old Constitution of my 
country.  I remembered that by our Constitution of 1830, we were constantly exposed 
to the bad luck of having a president of dubious intentions and with the sum of the 
really extraordinary faculties that our Constitution grants to him.  That this person was 
free to took everything, to devastate the institutions and to sank the country in the 
most dark of the dictatorships (Batlle in Nahum 1994: 63). 
Despite  that  one of  the most  contentious  reforms championed by Batlle  was  the 
creation  of  a  collegiate  executive  based  on  the  Swiss  experience—whose  basic 
rationales underlying the logic of this change stemmed from the notion that the office 
of the presidency remained susceptible to the whims of individuals and exigencies of 
specific political situations—there was an inter-party consensus that elections, rather 
civil wars, were the tool of political power by excellence.  Moreover, the first signs of 
mechanisms of direct democracy could be traced to these constitutional discussions 
and evidently had their seed on the very idea that sovereignty lies on the nation the 
nation lies on each and every citizen of the country.  For the reforms of 1917, Batlle 
championed the plebiscite as a measure in defense of freedom and against caprices 
of the state and public officials: 
“No podrán entonces los poderes públicos confabulados, o una asamblea nacional 
descarriada,  extender  legalmente  sus  propias  facultades,  o  desnaturalizarlas,  ni 
destruir  ni  eliminar  las libertades que vamos a crear,  a título  de interpretaciones 
constitucionales de simples leyes, a las que sería forzoso dar cumplimiento so pena 
de  colocarlas  fuera  de  las  instituciones  mismas  que  se  querría  defender.   El 
plebiscito segará de raíz la posibilidad de esta clase de atentados...” (De un discurso 
de Batlle en la Convención, El Día, 30 de mayo de 1916).
Despite the deep convictions of Batlle noted above, is notorious that there were also 
short-term partisan and political interests for advancing with direct democracy.  In 
case  the  legislature  was  adverse  to  some  reforms  (such  as  the  collegiate) 
mechanisms of direct democracy would offer the opportunity to transfer the political 
stalemate to a third arena: the arena of the citizenry.  Several books could be written 
analyzing  the  process  of  Constitutional  reforms  of  1917.   Nonetheless,  for  our 
interest it is enough to point out that after all, no mechanism of direct democracy was 
incorporated in this chart (despite being approved through a plebiscite legitimized by 
a ad-hoc law of February of 1912).  It is only in 1934 that, through a plebiscite based 
on a presidential decree—issued a year before during Terra’s dictatorship—a new 
Constitution  was  approved  and  this  time  obligatory  referendums  and  popular 
initiatives (only for constitutional matters) were included in the Chart.  
The constitution  of  1934 (Art.284)  spelled  out  several  ways  in  which  it  could  be 
reformed.  Among those, states that it may be reformed, totally or partially, according 
to the following procedures: (A) when a petition with the signatures of 20% of the 
citizens  is  presented  to  the  President  of  the  General  Assembly,  the  petition’s 
constitutional revisions must be submitted to popular  decision in the next national 
(regular) elections.  In a joint session by both houses, the General Assembly, can 
formulate alternative measures to be submitted to a popular  vote,  along with the 
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original popular initiative; (B) when constitutional revisions supported by two-fifths of 
the members of the General Assembly are submitted to its president, the revisions 
are subject to a popular vote during the next election.  In addition to points (A) and 
(B), to make the constitutional revisions binding an absolute majority of the citizens 
voting must cast a “yes” ballot in the elections.  If such number of votes is obtained, 
the  reform is  approved.   (C)  The  Constitution  might  also  be  reformed  by  those 
Constitutional  Laws  that  require  for  their  approval  two-thirds  of  the  General 
Assembly.   These laws  do not  need promulgation  by the  Executive,  and will  be 
binding  immediately  after  they  are  sanctioned  by  the  General  Assembly. 
Nonetheless, these laws will be subject of popular approval in the first election that is 
made after their sanction, and their final approval is contingent to a support of the 
majority of the citizenry.  When these Constitutional Laws are about the election of 
elective  positions,  citizens  will  vote  simultaneously  for  those  positions  by  the 
proposed system and the previous  one,  and the  final  results  will  depend on the 
popular decision. 
A new Constitution was approved on 1942 and for our purposes two mayor changes 
were done in regard mechanisms of direct democracy (See Art.281 in the Annex). 
First, the required percentage for triggering a petition was lowered to 10% (instead of 
20%)  and second,  it  incorporated  a  required  quorum for  approving  constitutional 
reforms either by a plebiscite or a popular initiative.  In other words,  to make the 
constitutional revisions binding an absolute majority of the citizens voting must cast a 
“yes” ballot in the elections, and must represent at least the 35% of the total inscribed 
in the National Civic Register.2
Nonetheless, Uruguayan maturity with direct democracy comes with the approval of 
the Constitution of 1967.  In this chart devices of direct democracy are categorized as 
referendums, initiatives (Art. 304), or revocation of laws (Art. 79, part .2).  The 1967 
constitution also refers to the use of referendums in Articles 79 and 331.  Article 331 
is  a  modified  version  of  previous  articles  284  and  281  and  does  not  present 
significant  changes.   According to Art  79, 25% of the electorate may employ the 
referendum mechanism against laws, within a year of their promulgation, passed by 
the legislature.  The referendum may not, though, be used to revise or repeal laws 
that establish taxes or any legislation that falls within the “exclusive initiative” of the 
Executive power.3  
However,  complications  arose  when  the  National  Commission  Pro-Referendum 
presented  to  the  Electoral  Court  on  December  17,  1987  634,792  signatures  to 
derogate Law 15848 on Amnesty for those involved in human rights violators during 
the military dictatorship (1973-1985).  At that point, the electoral authority realized 
that  the  constitutional  right  of  holding  a  referendum  was  never  regulated  .   On 
January 4, 1989, the Court establishes the date for a referendum for April 16 1989. 
2 Strictly speaking, the Constitution could be reformed with the support of 17.5%+1 of citizens 
(50%+1 of the 35% of the National Civic Register).
3 Law 16.017 (A) Las leyes constitucionales (literal D) del artículo 331 de la Constitución; (B) 
Las leyes cuya iniciativa, por razón de materia, es exclusiva del Poder Ejecutivo (artículos 86 
in fine, 133 y 214 de la Constitución); (C) Las leyes que establezcan tributos, entendiéndose 
por tales los impuestos, las tasas y las contribuciones especiales (artículos 11, 12 y 13 del 
Código  Tributario).   Unlike  in  other  countries,  for  example  Ecuador  and  France,  the 
Uruguayan president cannot call for a plebiscite or referendum.
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Nonetheless, the electoral authority claimed that it lacked suitable means for verifying 
the signatures of such amount of citizens and, consequently, through Law 16.017 of 
January 13, 1989, a new mechanism was created to solve this problem.4  It consisted 
of the following:  (a) 0.5% of the citizens qualified to vote can present legislation to 
the Electoral Court, i.e. more than 12,000 signatures (Art. 30); (b) Then,  two calls 
were made.  One is made during the period between sixty and ninety days after the 
signatures were validated; and the other was made in the year in which the law was 
being promulgated; and (c) reached in one of the two calls the concurrence and the 
affirmative vote of 25% of citizens, a referendum was to be held within following the 
120 days (Art. 37).
This device, of  two pre-referendum calls,  was a highly exceptional and expensive 
method for deciding whether or not a referendum was to be held.  Only 5 out of 1000 
citizens,  a  number  that  is  far  below  the  votes  needed  to  win  parliamentary 
representation, are required to trigger a mechanism that entails at least, two non-
working voting days and a huge amount of government expense.  In plain English, 
Uruguayans voted twice in order to decide whether to vote or not!!  Evidently, this 
way of deciding to have a referendum was pretty controversial.  As a matter of fact, 
the  legislature  modified  this  law  on  July  30,  2000  with  Law  17.244.   In  it,  the 
legislature changed the required signatures to trigger a pre-referendum to 2% of the 
registered voters (instead of  0.5%) within  150 days  (instead of  a  year)  from the 
promulgation of the law in consideration.  If the pre- referendum obtains more than 
25% of the registered voters, a referendum must be held during the next 120 days 
(Art.37).5  
Table 1 spells out all instances of mechanisms of direct democracy (at the national 
level) that arrived to the ballot-box since 1917.  
2. Actor strategies and the political process
Unlike other cases of the world where direct democracy derived at least partially from 
citizens’  demands  for  democratizing  the  political  game,  or  as  a  “natural” 
consequence  of  the  introduction  of  TICs,6 in  Uruguay  direct  democracy—in  its 
different  aspects—comes from an almost  natural  extension of  the electoral  game 
played by political parties.  As a matter of fact, it  is impossible to understand the 
direct democratic game in this country without  paying attention to the pivotal  role 
parties have had played in Uruguay.7  Direct democratic mechanisms serve also as 
instruments of legitimization of agreements among parties and party-fractions.8  
4 http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/leyes/ley16017.htm 
5 http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/Leyes/Ley17244.htm    
6 Despite being one of the most E-Ready countries in Latin America and currently one of the 
largest producers of software in the Western Hemisphere, so far TICs and MDDs do not seem 
to be empirically related in Uruguay’s context.  
7 In regard to the Uruguayan partytocracy see 
8 An  important  part  of  political  identities  is  directed  toward  fraction  rather  than  political 
parties. .  Even though it is relatively common for political parties to be internally divided into 
fractions  and  sometime factions,  the  peculiarity  of  the  Uruguayan  case  is  that  these  party 
fractions show great political visibility, to the point that in many cases they have been considered 
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It  would  take much more than this chapter  to analyze each mechanism of  direct 
democracy in Uruguay.  Nonetheless, I consider important to describe at least some 
of  the  last  measures  approved  or  rejected  by  Uruguayan  citizens.   The  first 
successful referendum in Uruguayan history—Referendum against articles 1, 2, 3, 
10, and 32 of Law 16.211 that promoted the Privatization of State-Publicly Owned 
Companies (December 13, 1992)—was well-noticed in Latin America because it was 
one of the very first democratic responses that sought to halt the (then) fashionable 
Washington Consensus in the region.  On November 27, 1989, Luis Alberto Lacalle 
(Blanco Party) won the presidency.  Lacalle’s electoral campaign was centered on 
promoting  economic  growth,  stability,  and deregulation  of  important  areas  of  the 
huge Uruguayan state.  After the legislative approval of a controversial privatization 
law in September 1991, the opposition had managed to force a referendum on the 
issue.  Early in 1992, the labor union of the National Telecommunication Company 
(ANTEL) triggered a campaign to revoke the law.  The Frente Amplio and two groups 
of the traditional parties immediately supported the campaign.  
During the first pre-referendum call on July 5 less than 19% supported the measure 
and it was in the second attempt that the pro-referendum commission gathered more 
than the  required  25% of  signatures  (32%)  on October  1st.   By  this  time,  other 
groups already were supporting the measure.  The Corte Electoral officially called the 
referendum  for  December  13  1992  and  President  Luis  Alberto  Lacalle  Herrera 
suffered a severe setback to his privatization program, a central component of his 
free-market  economic  policy,  when  five  laws  providing  for  the  sale  of  public 
companies were overwhelmingly rejected by 79% of the citizenry.  This situation was 
extremely similar to the referendum of 2003 that successfully revoked Law 17.448 (of 
January  4,  2002),  that  eliminated  the  monopoly  of  the  public  owned-company 
ANCAP, on the importation, exportation and refinement of oil.9
Popular initiatives are, by definition, the proactive tool per excellence in the hands of 
citizens  and therefore,  they allow changing the status quo.   Paradoxically,  in  the 
opportunities analyzed here, popular initiatives were held to maintain the status quo . 
Interestingly  enough,  both  popular  initiatives  underwent  the  way  of  constitutional 
reforms  because  the  organizers  could  not  legally  promote  a  referendum. 
Uruguayans  cannot  call  for  a  referendum on  issues  defined  within  the  exclusive 
domain of the executive power (such as taxation, budget, and the like). Therefore, 
these  popular  initiatives  were  the  backdoor  for  bypassing  the  former  institutional 
constrain; otherwise, they would have been classic referendums.  Note also that the 
“price” in terms of signatures is cheaper for a constitutional reform (10%) than for a 
referendum (25%).  
On November 27, 1994, the popular initiative on Social Security attempted to partially 
revoke the social  security system reform, approved by the parliament through the 
Accountability Law of October 1992 (rendición de cuentas).  With the law of 1992, 
pensions were adjusted periodically, without taking into account the variation of the 
cost of living, which was rapidly rising.  The promoters, the extremely powerful “gray 
coalition”, successfully included in the Constitution that pensions must be adjusted 
as real parties inside parties  .
 
  Nevertheless,  Uruguayan parties are still  parties,  as many 
scholars have argued , and they are thus best described as “fractionalized parties” .
9 See law at: http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/Leyes/Ley17448.htm 
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based on cost of living.  Before this popular initiative, the number of undecided voters 
was rather large.  However, public opinion polls foresaw a majority in favor of the 
consultation.  What appeared to be unusual in this initiative was the clear internal 
division of the traditional parties.
Attention  must  also  be  paid  to  the  only  successful  case  I  have  recorded  of 
referendum threat, which took place in 2002.  On February 21 of 2001, Congress 
approved Law 17.296, in which articles 612 & 613 opened the door for the creation of 
ANTEL S.A. in the realm of cellular telephony (ANTEL still is 100% a publicly-owned 
company—because of the 1992 referendum).  Eventually ANTEL S.A. would have a 
ceiling of 40% of its actions in the hands of privates and the State would retain 60% 
of  the  control  of  the  new  company.   Again,  the  union  of  ANTEL  (SUNATEL) 
successfully  gathered  more  than  the  25%  of  signatures  of  the  Registro  Cívico 
Nacional (approximately 684.000) and these were presented on February 19, 2002, 
to the Corte Electoral.  On March 2002, public opinion polls indicated that more than 
70% of  the  electorate  would  be  willing  to  vote  in  favor  of  the  referendum,  20% 
against,  and  there  were  around  10%  undecided.   The  fate  of  the  referendum 
appeared  as  clear  as  in  1992.   Before  the  referendum was  called  by the  Corte 
Electoral, the government through its Finance Minister, Alejandro Atchugarry, sent on 
May 2002 a bill to Congress withdrawing articles 612 & 613 of Law 17.296 in order to 
deactivate the referendum.  Congress approved the bill and the referendum was not 
called.
At  the beginning  of  1989,  electoral  year,  the  issue of  social  security  occupied  a 
critical  place  on  the  electoral  agenda.   "ONAJPU"  (National  Organization  of 
Pensioners), with the support of the Frente Amplio and the all Labor movement (PIT-
CNT), started to collect signatures towards a constitutional reform with the aim to 
include a specific measure that stated that the pensions have to follow the national 
salary index average.  A Constitutional reform was the only way in which ONAJPU 
could bypass a budget-related law, which is the sole prerogative of the executive. 
ONAJPU claimed that the Sanguinetti administration had failed to adequately adjust 
pensions due to his wish to reduce fiscal deficit .10  This initiative, beyond the control 
of political parties, became a relevant issue since it achieved much more than the 
10% of required signatures.  The pensioners’ movement asked for a clear definition 
of the support or not of each political group.  Taking into account that pensioners 
were a significant portion of the electorate, almost every political group supported the 
initiative  (even  though  this  consideration  was  in  clear  contradiction  with  their 
ideological  profile).   The  Batllismo  (Partido  Colorado)  was  the  only  numerically 
relevant group that did not support the initiative; however, other small groups (MAS 
Batllista in the Partido Colorado, and the MPP in the Frente Amplio) also took the 
same position.   The result  of  this  initiative  was  conclusive.   Almost  85% of  the 
electorate supported it, implying an imposition of the civil society over the political 
system, because the initiative and action were external of the traditional channels of 
public matters procedures (political parties).  In a popular initiative, concurrent with 
the presidential and legislative elections of 1989, 1,645,000 voted for the introduction 
of a clause into the constitution allowing for the future indexation of all pensions to 
current rates of salary increases.  
10 See also Moreira 
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This  situation  resembled  what  happened  with  the  promoters  of  the  constitutional 
reform that aimed to include drinkable water as a basic human right and to maintain 
all resources of water extraction, production, and commercialization in the hands of 
the State in 2004.  In both popular initiatives, the causal configuration was identical. 
In 2004, concurrently with legislative and executive elections, Uruguayans voted on a 
constitutional reform following a popular initiative instigated by workers of the state-
owned  Water  Company  (OSE)  together  with  the  Inter-Union  Workers  Plenary-
National Workers Convention (PIT-CNT), the Uruguayan labor federation.  Enjoying 
the  support  of  the  EP-FA-NM  and  half  of  the  Blanco  fractions,  the  reform  was 
approved by 64.59% of the valid vote.  Uruguayans, again, showed their confidence 
in  the  state  as  a  provider  of  public  services,  as  they  did  in  a  1992  national 
referendum that prohibited privatization of the largest state-owned companies.
3. Effects and evaluation of direct democracy
Because political parties have incentives to take positions on the issues at stake in 
popular initiatives, these cases offer the scholar interesting insights into the citizen-
party  linkage.   For  obvious  reasons,  congressmen  should  not  be  indifferent  to 
mechanisms  of  direct  democracy.   As  shown  previously,  these  institutional 
arrangements have deviated political outcomes from their original course elected in 
the assembly and if we claim that legislators are rational maximizers of power, one 
could assert that mechanisms of direct democracy, especially those "from below," 
undermine the power of elected officials and in consequence representatives should 
be, at least, suspicious of them.  
In order to test this, I studied legislator’s perceptions and opinions of mechanisms of 
direct  democracy  in  Uruguay.  I  conducted  interviews  with  Uruguayan  legislators 
taking into consideration the party affiliation of  each representative,  hypothesizing 
that those legislators from the left or those more liberal on social issues would be 
more supportive for mechanisms of direct democracy.  During the months of June 
and July 1997, I interviewed 91 out of 99 Uruguayan representatives. 
Surprisingly,  representatives  in  general  do  not  have  negative  attitudes  towards 
mechanisms of direct democracy.  On the contrary, more than half of representatives 
consider MDDs from below mechanisms that strengthen representative democracy 
(Question 1, see below) and agree in that there is no risk of a tyranny of the majority 
over the minority (Q2) (as an argument put  forward by many detractors of  direct 
democracy).11  Not  only do more than 60% of representatives deny the idea that 
MDDs from below weaken the power of congressmen (Q3), 70% of representatives 
consider that the presence of a potential referendum is a sufficient reason to look for 
a broad consensus within the political parties (Q4).  
Question (1):  What impact do popular initiatives have on representative democracy? (% 
and n)
Party Strengthen No affect Erode NS/NC Total 
Colorado 34.5 (10) 37.9 (11) 20.7 (6) 6.9 (2 ) 100 (29)
Blanco 46.4 (13) 21.4 (6) 25.0 (7) 7.1 (2) 100 (28)
11 See Gamble .
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FA 77.8 (21) 18.5 (5) 3.7 (1) 100 (27)
NE 40.0 (2) 60.0 (3) 100 (5)
Total 51.7 (46) 24.7 (22) 18.0 (16) 5.6 (5) 100 (89)
Question (2) “There is a risk of a tyranny of the majority over the minority” (% and n)
Party Totally agree Moderately 
agree
Neutral Moderately 
disagree
Totally 
disagree
NS/NC Total 
Colorado 6.9 (2) 13.8 (4) 10.3 (3) 20.7 (6) 48.3 (14) 100 (29)
Blanco 10.7 (3) 25.0 (7) 10.7 (3) 25.0 (7) 28.6 (8) 100 (28)
FA 13.8 (4) 6.9 (2) 13.8 (4) 20.7 (6) 41.4 (12) 3.4 (1) 100 (29)
NE 40.0 (2) 60.0 (3) 100 (5)
Total 9.9 (9) 14.3 (13) 13.2 (12) 24.2 (22) 37.4 (34) 100 (91)
Question (3) Do you think that popular initiatives and referendums weaken the power of  
congressmen elected by the citizenry? 
Party Totally 
agree 
Moderately 
agree
Neutral Moderately 
disagree
Totally 
disagree
NS/NC Total 
Colorado 20.7 (6) 10.3 (3) 13.8 (4) 17.2 (5) 37.9 (11) 100 (29)
Blanco 10.7 (3) 7.1 (2) 28.6 (8) 32.1 (9) 17.9 (5) 3.6 (1) 100 (28)
FA 6.9 (2) 17.2 (5) 27.6 (8) 48.3 (14) 100 (29)
NE 20.0 (1) 40.0 (2) 40.0 (2) 100 (5)
Total 9.9 (9) 8.8 (8) 18.7 (17) 26.4 (24) 35.2 (32) 1.1 (1) 100 (91)
Question (4) Is the presence of a potential referendum a sufficient reason to look for 
a broader consensus among political parties? (% and n) 
Party Totally 
agree 
Moderately 
agree
Moderately 
disagree
Totally disagree NS/NC Total
Colorado 17.2 (5) 51.7 (15) 13.8 (4) 10.3 (3) 6.9 (2) 100 (29)
Blanco 32.1 (9) 46.4 (13) 17.9 (5) 3.6 (1) 100 (28)
FA 13.8 (4) 55.2 (16) 31.0 (9) 100 (29)
NE 20.0 (1) 20.0 (1) 40.0 (2) 20.0 (1) 100 (5)
Total 20.9 (19) 49.5 (45) 22.0 (20) 5.5 (5) 2.2 (2) 100 (91)
Even  so,  the  general  support  for  mechanisms  of  direct  democracy  shown  by 
representatives  is  not  bluntly  blind.   In  general  terms,  deputies  recognized  that 
mechanisms of direct democracy are not applicable to every political situation.  More 
than 70% oppose the idea that  all issues at stake can be contemplated by popular 
initiatives and thus, avoid the institutional intermediation (Q5).  
Question (5)  “All  issues at stake can be contemplated by popular initiatives and thus,  
avoid the institutional intermediation” (% and n)
Party Totally agree Moderately 
agree
Neutral Moderately 
disagree
Totally 
disagree
NS/NC Total 
Colorado 10.3 (3) 6.9 (2) 6.9 (2) 10.3 (3) 65.5 (19) 100 (29)
Blanco 3.6 (1) 14.3 (4) 25.0 (7) 10.7 (3) 46.4 (13) 100 (28)
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FA 3.4 (1) 6.9 (2) 13.8 (4) 31.0 (9) 41.4 (12) 3.4 (1) 100 (29)
NE 20.0 (1) 60.0 (3) 20.0 (1) 100 (5)
Total 5.5 (5) 9.9 (9) 14.3 (13) 19.8(18) 49.5 (45) 100 (91)
Interesting enough, almost half of the representatives were highly suspicious of the 
capacities  of  citizens  to  effectively  weigh  decisions  using  mechanisms  of  direct 
democracy (Q6), albeit at the same time they recognized that mechanisms of direct 
democracy  combat  citizen  alienation  and  apathy  (Q7).   What  is  more,  a  broad 
majority  believes  that  through  mechanisms  of  direct  democracy  civic  virtues  are 
developed (Q8).
Question (6)  “The common citizen lacks sufficient elements in order to decide on highly  
complex issues” (% and n)
Party Totally agree Moderately 
agree
Neutral Moderately 
disagree
Totally 
disagree
NS/NC Total 
Colorado 41.4 (12) 20.7 (6) 3.4 (1) 6.9 (2) 27.6 (8) 100 (29)
Blanco 50.0 (14) 17.9 (5) 14.3 (4) 10.7 (3) 7.1 (2) 100 (28)
FA 13.8 (4) 17.2 (5) 10.3 (3) 27.6 (8) 31.0 (9) 100 (29)
NE 20.0 (1) 20.0 (1) 20.0 (1) 40.0 (2) 100 (5)
Total 34.1 (31) 18.5 (17) 9.9 (9) 16.5 (15) 20.9 (19) 100 (91)
Question (7) Do you think that popular initiatives combat apathy? (% and n)
Party Totally 
agree 
Moderately 
agree
Neutral Moderately 
disagree
Totally 
disagree
NS/NC Total 
Colorado 20.7 (6) 44.8 (13) 10.3 (3) 17.2 (5) 6.9 (2) 100 (29)
Blanco 7.1 (2) 21.4 (6) 21.4 (6) 25.0 (7) 21.4 (6) 3.6 (1) 100 (28)
FA 24.1 (7) 51.7 (15) 6.9 (2) 3.4 (1) 13.8 (4) 100 (29)
NE 20.0 (1) 40.0 (2) 20.0 (1) 20.0 (1) 100 (5)
Total 17.6 (16) 39.6 (36) 13.2 (12) 15.4 (14) 13.2 (12) 1.1 (1) 100 (91)
Question (8) Do you think that through popular initiatives civic virtues are developed? (% 
and n)
Party Totally 
agree 
Moderately 
agree
Neutral Moderately 
disagree
Totally 
disagree
NS/NC Total 
Colorado 27.6 (8) 48.3 (14) 10.3 (3) 10.3 (3) 3.4 (1) 100 (29)
Blanco 25.0 (7) 39.3 (11) 21.4 (6) 10.7 (3) 3.6 (1) 100 (28)
FA 48.3 (14) 37.9 (11) 3.4 (1) 6.9 (2) 3.4 (1) 100 (29)
NE 40.0 (2) 40.0 (2) 20.0 (1) 100 (5)
Total 34.1 (31) 39.6 (36) 11.0 (10) 11.0 (10) 2.2 (2) 2.2 (2) 100 (91)
It also deserves few words the relationship between legislators’ opinions regarding 
mechanisms  of  direct  democracy  and  their  party  affiliation.   Moreover,  is  it 
remarkable  also  the  relationship  of  their  postures  in  regard  MDD  and  their 
relationship with their post-material values developed by Altman .  For this reason, 
we developed a battery of elements that allowed me to create a direct democracy 
index.  The index was built based on ten questions and a score within a scale of 1-10 
was given to each answer.  We calculated the average and standard deviation of 
each party, 10 representing the strongest sympathizer of direct democracy and 1 the 
strongest opponent of it.  Perhaps the most interesting aspect of my findings is that 
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the direct-democracy index is positively associated with the left-right one but there is 
no association with the index on post-material values (see Table 3), a relationship 
that  is  clearly  expressed  in  the  matrix  scatter  plots  below.   It  seems that  direct 
democracy does not belong to the "package" of postmaterialist values.  
Table 3: Bivariate Correlations among Indices 
Post-material 
Post-material 1 Left-Right 
Left-Right -,474(**) 1 Direct democracy 
Direct democracy ,200 -,475(**) 1
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Post-Materialist
Values
Left-Right
MDD
4 6 8 10
0
5
10
0 5 10
0
5
10
How  can  the  overall  sympathy  Uruguayan  legislators’  show  towards  direct 
democracy  be  explained?   My  answer  is  simple:  it  is  a  matter  of  political 
legitimization.  As previously stated, direct democracy could not have been analyzed 
only taking into account those initiatives that  reach the ballot-box;  sometimes the 
simple  threat of activating and using a popular inititative or a referendum must be 
seriously taken into account.  In a way, the Uruguayan experience could be related to 
the Swiss experiences with institutions of direct democracy.  In Switzerland, as in 
Uruguay, the potential of an IDD is already a relevant actor in the political arena.  As 
Kobach explains, “Switzerland’s Konkordanz-Demokratie is more firmly entrenched 
and more widely accepted than it might have been otherwise.  Ironically, the blunt 
majoritarianism of the referendum has done much to foster the politics of consensus” 
.  He adds, “paradoxically, the referendum, which is a very majoritarian way of setting 
disputes, tends to prevent tyranny of the majority in Switzerland” .  Uruguay fits this 
logic perfectly.  And it is not strange that both, Switzerland and Uruguay, could be, in 
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a way, characterized as the most consociational regimes in their respective regions 
(Western Europe and Latin America).  In light of this realization, not only do citizen 
initiatives  act  as  a  system  of  political  accountability,  with  a  high  degree  of 
legitimization, but they also are the producers of political consensus. 
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C2D Working Paper Series 24/2008
4. ANEXO
Constitution of 1934. Article 284
La presente Constitución podrá ser reformada, total  o parcialmente,  según los siguientes 
procedimientos: A) El veinte por ciento de los ciudadanos inscriptos en el Registro Cívico 
podrá plantear la reforma en un proyecto articulado que se elevará a la Asamblea General, 
debiéndose consultar al pueblo en la elección inmediata.  La Asamblea General en reunión 
de  ambas  Cámaras,  podrá  presentar  fórmulas  sustitutivas,  que  someterá  a  decisión 
plebiscitaria  conjuntamente  con  la  iniciativa  popular.   B)  Todo  proyecto  de  reforma 
constitucional que reúna dos quintos del total de componentes de la Asamblea General, en 
reunión de ambas Cámaras, será sometido al plebiscito en la primera elección que se realice. 
En  los  casos  de  los  incisos  A)  y  B),  para  que  el  plebiscito  tenga  valor  aprobatorio,  se 
requerirá que vote por "sí" la mayoría absoluta de los ciudadanos legalmente hábiles para 
votar.  Obtenido ese número de sufragios, la reforma se considerará promulgada.  C)  La 
Constitución podrá ser reformada, también, por Leyes Constitucionales que requerirán para 
su sanción los dos tercios del total de componentes de cada una de las Cámaras, dentro de 
una misma Legislatura.  Las Leyes Constitucionales no necesitarán promulgación del Poder 
Ejecutivo  y  entrarán  en  vigencia  inmediatamente  después  de  sancionadas  por  ambas 
Cámaras.  Sin perjuicio de ello, se someterán al referéndum popular en la primera elección 
que se realice después de su sanción, estándose a la decisión plebiscitaria, pronunciada por 
la mayoría de votos emitidos.  Cuando las Leyes Constitucionales se refieran a la elección de 
cargos de carácter electivo, al ser sometidas al plebiscito, -simultáneamente se votará para 
esos  cargos  por  el  sistema  propuesto  y  por  el  anterior-  teniendo  al  respecto  carácter 
imperativo la decisión plebiscitaria.
Constitution of 1942. Article 281 states that: 
La  presente  Constitución  podrá  ser  reformada,  total  o  parcialmente,  conforme  a  los 
siguientes procedimientos: A)  Por iniciativa del diez por ciento de los ciudadanos inscriptos 
en  el  Registro  Cívico  Nacional,  presentando  un  proyecto  articulado  que  se  elevará  al 
Presidente  de la  Asamblea General,  debiendo ser  sometido a  la  decisión popular,  en la 
elección  más  inmediata.   La  Asamblea  General,  en  reunión  de  ambas  Cámaras,  podrá 
formular proyectos sustitutivos que someterá a la decisión plebiscitaria, juntamente con la 
iniciativa  popular.   B)  Por  proyectos  de  reforma  que  reúnan  dos  quintos  del  total  de 
componentes de la Asamblea General, presentados al Presidente de la misma, los que serán 
sometidos al  plebiscito en la primera elección que se realice.  Para que el  plebiscito sea 
afirmativo en los casos de los incisos A) y B), se requerirá que vote por "SI" la mayoría 
absoluta de los ciudadanos que concurran a los comicios, la que debe representar por lo 
menos, el treinta y cinco por ciento del total de inscriptos en el Registro Cívico Nacional.  C) 
Los  Senadores,  los  Representantes  y  el  Poder  Ejecutivo  podrán presentar  proyectos de 
reforma que deberán ser aprobados por mayoría absoluta del total de los componentes de la 
Asamblea General.  El proyecto que fuere desechado no podrá reiterarse hasta el siguiente 
período legislativo,  debiendo observar  las mismas formalidades.   Aprobada la iniciativa  y 
promulgada por el Presidente de la Asamblea General, el Poder Ejecutivo convocará, dentro 
de los noventa días siguientes, a elecciones de una Convención Nacional Constituyente que 
deliberará y resolverá sobre las iniciativas aprobadas para la reforma, así como sobre las 
demás que puedan presentarse ante la Convención. […]  El proyecto o proyectos redactados 
por la Convención deberán ser ratificados por el Cuerpo Electoral, convocado al efecto por el 
Poder  Ejecutivo,  en  la  fecha  que  indicará  la  Convención  Nacional  Constituyente.  Los 
votantes se expresarán por "Sí" o por "No" y si fueran varios los textos de enmienda, se 
pronunciarán por separado sobre cada uno de ellos.  […] La reforma o reformas deberán ser 
aprobadas por mayoría de sufragios, que no será inferior al treinta y cinco por ciento de los 
ciudadanos inscriptos en el Registro Cívico Nacional.  En los casos de los apartados A) y B) 
sólo se someterán a la ratificación plebiscitaria simultánea a las más próximas elecciones, los 
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proyectos que hubieran sido presentados con seis meses de anticipación -por lo menos- a la 
fecha de aquéllas, o con tres meses para las fórmulas sustitutivas que aprobare la Asamblea 
General en el primero de dichos casos.  Los presentados después de tales términos, se 
someterán al plebiscito conjuntamente con las elecciones subsiguientes.  D) La Constitución 
podrá ser reformada, también, por leyes constitucionales que requerirán para su sanción, los 
dos tercios del total de componentes de cada una de las Cámaras dentro de una misma 
Legislatura.  Las  leyes  constitucionales  no  podrán  ser  vetadas  por  el  Poder  Ejecutivo  y 
entrarán en vigencia luego que el electorado convocado especialmente en la fecha que la 
misma ley determine, exprese su conformidad por mayoría absoluta de los votos emitidos y 
serán promulgadas por el Presidente de la Asamblea General.   E) Si la convocatoria del 
Cuerpo Electoral para la ratificación de las enmiendas, en los casos de los apartados A), B), 
C) y D) coincidiera con alguna elección de integrantes de órganos del Estado, los ciudadanos 
deberán expresar su voluntad sobre las reformas constitucionales, en documento separado y 
con independencia de las listas de elección. Cuando las reformas se refieran a la elección de 
cargos electivos, al ser sometidas al plebiscito, simultáneamente se votará para esos cargos 
por el sistema propuesto y por el anterior, teniendo fuerza imperativa la decisión plebiscitaria.
Constitution of 1967. Art. 79. 
[…] El veinticinco por ciento del total de inscriptos habilitados para votar, podrá interponer, 
dentro del año de su promulgación, el recurso de referéndum contra las leyes y ejercer el 
derecho  de  iniciativa  ante  el  Poder  Legislativo.  Estos  institutos  no  son  aplicables  con 
respecto  a  las  leyes  que  establezcan  tributos.  Tampoco  caben en  los  casos  en  que  la 
iniciativa sea privativa del Poder Ejecutivo. Ambos institutos serán reglamentados por ley, 
dictada por mayoría absoluta del total de componentes de cada Cámara.
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Table 1: Use of Mechanisms of Direct Democracy in Uruguay (1917-1973)
MDD Type Date Procedure Type Origin % Yes Accepted Issue
Registered 
voters Turnout
1. Obligatory re-
ferendum Nov. 25, 1917
Ad-hoc  law of 
Feb.1912 LEG 38.11% Yes
Regimen Colegiado, Separation Church 
and State 223,020 40.05%
2. Plebiscite Apr. 19, 1934
Ad-hoc 
presidential 
decree
LEG 52.53% Yes
Re-Establishment  of  presidentialism, 
incorporation  of  constitutional 
plebiscites, change of representation at 
the Senate
422,865 54.93%
3. Obligatory re-
ferendum
4. Obligatory re-
ferendum
Mar. 27, 1938
Art. 284 (C) EXE 93.45% Yes President  elected  through  DSV,  re-organization of the senate. 636,171
Art. 284 (B) LEG 52.47% Yes
Unique  presidential  candidate  per 
Lema;  and  reorganization  of  the  local 
administration. 
636,171 56.15%
5. Obligatory re-
ferendum Nov. 29, 1942 Art. 284 (B) LEG 51.64% Yes Change to proportional representation 858,713 66.91%
6. Plebiscite
7. Plebiscite
Nov. 24, 1946
Art. 281 (B) LEG 25.39% No Election of President and Vice without a lema 993,892 25.39%
Art. 281 (B) EXE 29.09% No Conformation of State Council 993,892 29.09%
8. Pop. Ini. Nov. 26, 1950 Art. 281 (A) OPP 0.18% No Several modifications 1,168,206 70.92%
9. Obligatory re-
ferendum Dec. 16, 1951 Art. 281 (D) LEG 20.02% Yes Reestablishment of colegiado regime 1,158,939 37.08%
10. Plebiscite 
(Counter- 
proposal) 
11. Pop. Ini.
Nov. 30, 1958
Art. 331 (B) LEG 16.74% No Back to president elected without lema 1,409,372 60.57%
Art. 331 (A) OPP 10.90% No Back to president elected with a DSV 1,409,372 54.74%
12. Pop. Ini. Nov. 25, 1962 Art. 331 (B) OPP 12.81% No Back to presidentialism 1,526,868 76.69%
13. Plebiscite 
(Counter- 
proposal)
14. Pop. Ini.
15. Plebiscite 
(Counter- 
proposal)
16. Pop. Ini.
Nov. 27, 1966
Art. 331 (B) LEG 47.51% Yes “Orange” - Regimen de Gobierno 1,656,332 47.51%
Art. 331 (A) OPP 4.92% No “Yellow” - Regimen de Gobierno 1,656,332 4.92%
Art. 331 (B) EXE 9.75% No “Gray” - Regimen de Gobierno 1,656,332 9.75%
Art. 331 (A) OPP 0.06% No “Pink” - Regimen de Gobierno 1,656,332 0.06%
17. Plebiscite Nov. 28, 1971 Art. 331 (B) EXE 26.21% No President’s reelection 1,875,660 26.21%
18. Pop. Ini. Nov. 28, 1971 Art. 331 (A) OPP 0.10% No Interpellation of the president 1,875,660 0.10%
19. Plebiscite Nov. 30, 1980 .. EXE 42.09% No Constitution 1,944,951 78.65%
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Table 2: Use of Mechanisms of Direct Democracy in Uruguay since 1985
MDD Type Date Procedure Type Origin % Yes Accepted Issue
Registered 
voters Turnout
20. Referendum Apr. 16, 1989 Art. 79 OPP 42.47% No Amnesty law 2,283,597 82.39%
21. Pop. Ini. Nov. 26, 1989 Art. 331 (A) OPP 72.51% Yes Adjustment of pensions to inflation 2,319,022 72.51%
22. Referendum Dec. 13, 1992 Art. 79 OPP 79.11% Yes Partial  withdrawal  of  the  privatization law 2,345,077 79.11%
23. Plebiscite Aug. 18, 1994 Art. 331 (C) LEG 31.38% No Constitutional reforms 2,278,375 78.95%
24. Pop. Ini. Nov. 27, 1994 Art. 331 (A) OPP 54.42% Yes Stopping "hidden cuts" in pensions 2,328,468 54.43%
25. Pop. Ini. Nov. 27, 1994 Art. 331 (A) OPP 28.59% No 27% of the budget for education 2,328,468 28.59%
26. Plebiscite Dec. 8, 1996 Art. 331 (D) LEG 50.45% Yes Constitutional reforms 2,343,920 83.03%
27. Referendum Jun. 17, 1998 Art. 79 OPP 22.40% No Opposing  the  Law  of  Energy Framework 2,385,065 22.08%
28. Referendum Sep. 20, 1998 Art. 79 OPP 4.72% No Time  available  to  workers  to  make claims against employers 2,379,543 4.64%
29. Plebiscite Oct. 31, 1999 Art. 331 (B) LEG 37.71% No Limitation  to  executives  of  public services in running for office 2,402,160 92.34%
30. Plebiscite Oct. 31, 1999 Art. 331 (B) LEG 42.36% No Financial autonomy for Courts 2,402,160 92.34%
31. Referendum Feb. 18, 2001 Art. 79 OPP 20.66% No Derogation  of  13  articles  of  Law XX.XXX (Ley de Urgencia) 2,394,219 20.66%
32. Referendum Aug. 5, 2002 Art. 79 OPP n.a. Yes Derogation of Articles 612 & 613 of Law 17.296 (ANCEL S.A.) 2,394,219
33. Pop. Ini. Oct. 31, 2004 Art. 331 (A) OPP 63.00% Yes Inclusion  of  Water  as  a  Basic  Human Right in the Constitution 2,488,004 90.00%
34. Referendum Dec. 7, 2003 Art. 79 OPP 62.21% Yes Derogation of Law 17.448 (ANCAP) 2,466,680 76.45%
Sources: Author’s database, , , C2D Database
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